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1. Introduction
1.1. Because the Third Eye Ain’t Open
Trying to understand the people storming the US Capitol
—the physical and symbolic heart of US democracy—
on January 6, 2021, early media reports unearthed an
interview given to Austrian public broadcaster ORF by
Jacob Anthony Angeli Chansley (or Jake Angeli), self‐
proclaimed shaman of conspiracy phenomenon QAnon
and prominent participant in the riots:
And so, as a Shaman, I am like a multidimensional
or hyperdimensional being, ok? I am able to per‐
ceive multiple different frequencies of life beyond
my five senses and it allows me to see into these
other, higher dimensions that these entities, these
pedophiles, these rapists, these murderers, really
high up people, that they almost like hide in the
shadow. Nobody can see that because the third eye
ain’t open. (etzimanuel, 2021, 8:50m)
Hilarious nonsense to some, pathological obscurity to
others, his statement was crystal clear to QAnon con‐
spiracists. They believe in a secret, Deep State cabal
of politicians, billionaires, and celebrities that they con‐
sider to be pedophiles and human traffickers that rule
the world and extend their lives through the blood
of abused children. These beliefs echo longer‐standing
conspiracies, famously promoted by Alex Jones, (now
disgraced) founder of Infowars. Long before the 2017
emergence of QAnon, Jones propagated conspiracies,
many based on his worldview: a fantasy‐infused, idiosyn‐
cratic interpretation of Simulation Theory (Bostrom,
2003). As Jones ‘explained’ on the Joe Rogan Experience
(PowerfulJRE, 2017):
Media and Communication, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 3, Pages 179–188 179
There’s at least 12 dimensions, and all the top scien‐
tists and billionaires are coming out, saying it’s a false
hologram. It is artificial; the computers are scanning
it and finding tension points where it’s artificially pro‐
jected….There is this ‘Sub‐transmission Zone’ below
the third dimension which is turned over to the most
horrible things….And our species is already way up
at the fifth/sixth dimension consciousnally [sic]—our
best people. But there’s this war, trying to basically
destroy Humanity, because Humanity has free will.
And there’s a decision—which level we want to go
to. We have free will, so Evil is allowed to come
and contend.
The January 6 events served as a powerful reminder
of the mainstreaming and mobilizing powers of conspir‐
acy theories. Conspiracy theories very much predate the
current climate of mis/dis/malinformation but recent
years have seen a boom in revived and new conspir‐
acy theories and in those rallying around them. These
include: Flat‐Earthers, who dismiss scientific proof of a
round earth as a conspiracy of the Royal Society and
NASA; Birthers, refuting that former US president Barack
Obama was born in the US, a presidential prerequi‐
site; those convinced that so‐called Illuminati secretly
control the world, an Alex Jones favorite picked up by
QAnon; Anti‐Vaxxers, opposing the scientific consensus
that vaccines are safe; and, recently, Covid‐19 conspir‐
acists. The latter includes debunked notions of Covid‐19
as unleashed byMicrosoft founder and philanthropist Bill
Gates to sell vaccines and/or to plant microchips in every
person, and Covid‐19 being transmitted by 5G towers.
Academic attention has focused on the particulars
of a given conspiracy theory and on psychological and
sociological explanations for their attraction. Much less
attention has been paid to the forces/processes through
which conspiracy theories make it from the margins
to the mainstream, and that is the focus of this arti‐
cle. We argue that this requires attention: 1) to the
ideological nature of conspiracy theories, 2) to those
actively propagating conspiracies, 3) to their use of the
affordances of digital media and popular culture and,
4) to conspiracy theory followers as audiences and fans.
Crucially, we argue that incorporating concepts and find‐
ings from the study of digital popular culture and its
audience‐fans into existing explanations of conspiracism
can help us to understand the mainstreaming of conspir‐
acy theories.
In their overview of work on conspiracy theories,
Baden and Sharon (2021) mention research from fields
including political communication, philosophy, social psy‐
chology, anthropology, history, law, and discourse stud‐
ies, but there is no mention of a (digital) popular culture
perspective. We take inspiration from scholars such as
Street (2019) and van Zoonen (2005) who point out the
growing convergence between politics and popular cul‐
ture, politicians and celebrity, news and entertainment,
citizenship and consumerism. We see this convergence
at the heart of themainstreaming of conspiracy theories.
Wedevelop a framework inspired by the literature on ide‐
ology and propaganda, on conspiracism, on digital media
and popular culture’s affordances as conduits for ideol‐
ogy, and on views on audience and fan engagement with
digital content. We start from a conception of conspir‐
acy theories as ideological and from the role of so‐called
ideological entrepreneurs (North, 1981) in pushing con‐
spiracy theories to generate ideological change. We con‐
sider how their efforts to push a conspiracy‐propaganda
message are affected by characteristics of celebrity and
of the evolving media and popular culture that serve as
ideological intermediaries. We complement sociological
and psychological explanations with insights from digi‐
tal audience and fan studies to understand how various
audiences help distribute, reinforce, or refute conspir‐
acies. This is instrumental in pushing conspiracy theo‐
ries and their propagators from the margins to the main‐
stream. To illustrate, we refer to “conspiracy magnate”
Alex Jones and the person(s) representing Q of QAnon.
The focus is on the US but there are many indications
that their impact goes beyond the US borders.
1.2. Meet the Great Conspirators
Alex Jones is a US radio show host, founder of
Infowars.com and, in his words, the “most para‐
noid man in America” (for detailed analysis: Van den
Bulck & Hyzen, 2020). Ignoring factual evidence, Jones
presents economic predictions, pseudo‐science‐meets‐
popular‐culture phantasy and conspiracies emphasizing
Illuminati, Deep State, and false flags (e.g., 9/11 as a
US government job). As his popularity grew, so did
his conspiracy spectrum, most notably in his insistence
on the 2012 Sandy Hook mass shooting was a covert
government operation, a so‐called false flag (Van den
Bulck & Hyzen, 2020). In 2016, as part of his attack on
Hillary Clinton, Jones sided with then‐presidential can‐
didate Donald Trump. He was a prominent propagator
of so‐called Pizzagate—a (debunked) conspiracy theory
regarding involvement of top Democrats in a sex traffick‐
ing ring—and of key Democrats being lizard people, later
elaborated upon by QAnon. At the height of his popu‐
larity (2017–2018), Jones and his claims attracted two
million weekly listeners to his syndicated and streamed
radio show, up to 1,3 billion views to his YouTube chan‐
nels, and 20millionmonthly visits to Infowars.com—80%
from the US. Following growing criticism and a convic‐
tion in a Sandy Hook defamation suit, in late 2018, Jones
was banned from social media, affecting his ability to
reach out and, to him, effectively proving the Deep State.
Regardless, Jones remains in the public eye, promoting
conspiracies, including President Biden as a shapeshift‐
ing lizard, appearing at alt‐right rallies, and claiming
strong involvement in organizing the January 6th rally
and subsequent storming of the US Capitol.
QAnon originated in October 2017 when one or
more people started posting under the name Q on
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anonymous imageboard 4chan, later extending activi‐
ties to 8chan/8kun and beyond. Q presented itself as
US insider with top military clearance and knowledge
of Deep State activities. Through countless “drops” or
cryptic posts, followers (“anons”) are invited to become
“bakers,” studying crumbs of evidence to turn into
dough/bread that exposes Deep State machinations
(Quincy, 2018). Conspiracy topics vary, from Pizzagate to
the Covid‐19 pandemic as a false flag but emphasize a
liberal, affluent elite of child‐abusing Satan worshippers.
Crucially, President Trump was presented as recruited by
the US military to help fight the Deep State, an effort
that followers are invited to support. In the fall of 2020,
social media increasingly blocked and removed QAnon
content for falsehoods and instigation of violence. Q was
instrumental in pushing a voter fraud conspiracy theory
surrounding the 2020 US presidential elections, resulting
in QAnon followers being heavily involved in the storm‐
ing of the US Capitol. At the time of writing, Q’s iden‐
tity remained unknown, although in December 2020,
Business Insider published a list of the 200 main QAnon
contributors, including “celebrities, politicians, activists,
military veterans, men’s rights activists, media personal‐
ities, and the name of the person who probably is the
mysterious ‘Q’ ” (Edwards & Davies, 2020).
2. Conspiracy Theories, Ideology, and Ideological
Entrepreneurs
2.1. Conspiracy Theories as Ideology
The starting point is the distinct surge in conspiracism,
i.e., the belief in conspiracy theories. The term conspir‐
acy theories refers to a seemingly diverse range of the‐
ories revolving around secret activities and subversions
of invisible enemies, often relating to covert govern‐
ment operations (so‐called False Flags) and cover‐ups (by
the so‐called Deep State). We follow Baden and Sharon
(2021) and Cassam (2020), who distinguish between the‐
ories about conspiracies that have turned out to be
factual—such as the propaganda campaign based on fab‐
ricated claims that SaddamHussein had bothweapons of
mass destruction and ties with Al‐Qaeda, which led the
US into the second Iraq war—and Conspiracy Theories
(Cassam, 2020) or Conspiracy Theories Proper (Baden
& Sharon, 2021) that are unproven, our main focus.
Different from e.g., Baden and Sharon (2021, p. 85), we
do not consider conspiracy theories as “a distinct, patho‐
logical phenomenon” but follow Aupers (2012, p. 22),
who sees conspiracism as, “A cultural phenomenon that
revolves around epistemological doubts about the valid‐
ity of scientific knowledge claims, ontological insecurity
about rationalized social systems like the state, multina‐
tionals and the media; and a relentless ‘will to believe’ in
a disenchanted world.”
Following Billig (1989), Byford (2014), and Cassam
(2020), we consider conspiracy theories as ideology.
Conspiracy operates as an ideological lens and (belief
in it) is not so much about a theory’s specifics but higher‐
order beliefs like distrust of authority. As such, conspir‐
acy theories serve as smokescreens for an ideological‐
political agenda (Byford, 2014; Cassam, 2020). Following
Thompson (1991), we consider ideology as a world view
and value system, a set of beliefs held by (sections of)
a society that serves not just to ensure cohesion but
to maintain power relations. In this, ideologies do not
so much serve as a unifying force, but legitimate the
positions of and relationships between various groups.
Engels and Marx (1848/1977) consider a determinis‐
tic model where the economic structure, especially the
dominant superstructure’s interests, bears on ideology
within capitalist societies. Gramsci (1971, pp. 376–377)
instead distinguishes between “historically organic ide‐
ologies… which are necessary to the structure, and ide‐
ologies that are arbitrary, rationalistic and ‘willed.’ ” Hall
(1985, p. 94) concurs, saying there is “no necessary corre‐
spondence” between structure and ideology. Conspiracy
theories can fit either (organic or arbitrary) category and
so, like ideology, do not have to follow from the super‐
structure. Various stakeholders of some ideological issue
or another can participate in ideological formation and
its circulation and can affect some material outcome.
Conspiracy theories can be instrumental in this, as:
Their basic function is to advance a political or ide‐
ological objective, be it opposition to gun control,
anti‐Semitism, hostility to federal government or
whatever. Conspiracy Theories advance a political
objective in a special way: by advancing seductive
explanations of major events that, objectively speak‐
ing, are unlikely to be true but are likely to influence
public opinion in the preferred direction. (Cassam,
2020, p. 11)
Conspiracy theories and their following do not fit tra‐
ditional party‐political divisions, as is the case of Flat
Earthers, Anti‐Vaxxers, 9/11, or Covid‐19 conspiracists.
However, they tend to fall in with extremist politi‐
cal ideologies, be it on the left (anti‐capitalist) or the
right (distrust of government; Cassam, 2020). In the US,
recently, conspiracy theories have become more visibly
related to alt‐right and populist movements, encompass‐
ing “different branches of White nationalism, including
‘scientific’ racists, sections of the neonazi movement,
and adherents of European New Right ideology” (Lyons,
2017, para. 2), themselves increasingly connecting to the
so‐called manoscape. The latter involves both activist
men’s movements like the Proud Boys, aiming to change
a status quo perceived as dominated by women, and
online communities like incels, who believe in a femi‐
nist conspiracy to manipulate men and vow to stay away
from women (Lin, 2017). Much attention has gone to
howUS President Trumpembraced conspiracism and the
alt‐right and how the end of his term culminated in a vio‐
lent convergence of conspiracism and alt‐right.
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2.2. Selling Conspiracies: The Role of Ideological
Entrepreneurs
Conspiracy theories are essentially ideological, aimed
at challenging prevailing ideologies, and are generated
and spread by ideological entrepreneurs. Ideological
entrepreneurs, a concept introduced by North (1981),
refer to figures that play a key role in ideological change
and thrive in times of upheaval and alienation—a con‐
dition that also feeds conspiracism—when people are
open to alternative interpretations of how things work.
An ideological entrepreneur:
Would be alert to opportunities to sell a new ideol‐
ogy that better explains the world than existing ide‐
ologies. [They] would be a bold innovator who cre‐
ated new conceptions of how the world works or
combined and presented existing models of how the
world works in new ways (i.e., to promote ideologi‐
cal development). [They] would work to capture the
ideological marketplace, competing fiercely against
other ideological entrepreneurs as well as against the
weight of existing public opinion and conventions.
(Storr, 2011, pp. 107–108)
Ideological entrepreneurs can include politicians but
more often are non‐party actors:media personalities like
right‐wing radio host Rush Limbaugh, public intellectual
and one of the “Four Horsemen of the Non‐Apocalypse”
Sam Harris; YouTube Professor Jordan Peterson, a
Christian traditionalist and critic of political correctness;
former Breitbart editor, neo‐conservative podcaster Ben
Shapiro; and, indeed Alex Jones and QAnon. The ideo‐
logical entrepreneur’s success is based on providing “a
convincing image of a relationship between the specific
injustices perceived by various groups and the larger sys‐
tem which the ideological entrepreneurs desire altered”
(Storr, 2011, p. 108), alongside a guide to action and a
clear picture of what a world will look like without these
injustices. The latter can be dystopian or utopian and can
compete with more scientific/common‐sense/meaning‐
ful explanations. Taking Martin’s (2015) simple but clear
conception of ideology as values + beliefs = opinion and
applying it to conspiracy‐ideological entrepreneurs, they
advance ideology to displace beliefs. They generate and
propagate ideology expressed as alternative histories,
science, political views, interpretations, amongst others,
to affect public opinion and ensure followers’ loyalties.
As such, ideological entrepreneurs operate as propagan‐
dists. Their end goal is to challenge and displace pre‐
vailing ideologies and manipulate/manage public opin‐
ion towards conspiracy indoctrination.
As an ideological entrepreneur, Q’s push of a 2020
presidential election fraud has the relationship between
Deep State and traditional US politics at the heart of
its conspiracy—with (President) Trump as the “savior.”
This has earlier roots in the ideological work of Alex
Jones, who forged a relationship between conspiracism,
the alt‐right, and Trump politics. Identifying as libertar‐
ian and paleo‐conservative, Jones made a turn to actual
politics in the run‐up to the 2016 presidential elections
when he and Trump endorsed each other, with Jones
telling Trump over the air: “Ninety percent of my listen‐
ers are Trump supporters”; and a triumphant president‐
elect telling Jones, “Listen, Alex, I just talked to the kings
and the queens of the world. I want to thank you, your
audience” (Van den Bulck & Hyzen, 2020). By the time
Jones fell out with Trump (his 2017 order of an attack on
Syria upset Jones’ isolationism), crying on‐air and rant‐
ing “Fuck Trump, and fuck these fucking people” (Politi,
2018), much of the ideological work was done.
However, many conspiracies pushed by Jones and
Q are not party‐political but equally ideological: Sandy
Hook, Pizzagate, lizard people, Covid‐19, and 5G, the
fourth dimension of evil. It can prove challenging to
conceptualize such fantastical, irrational theories within
any framework of rational thought or traditional ideo‐
logical framework for political discourse, left/right pro‐
paganda campaigns, international conflicts, and reli‐
gious affiliations. Looking closer, though, these theo‐
ries serve the same ideological function as, for instance,
traditional socialist or neo‐liberal doctrine. Take polit‐
ical elites as secretly shape‐shifting lizards who eat
children or globalist elites as a cabal of international
pedophiles. Setting aside irrationality or evidence, push‐
ing such beliefs serves the most traditional political
functions: to denigrate opposing parties, damage spe‐
cific politicians or general left/right values. As such,
the conspiracy‐ideological entrepreneur’s discourse is
similar to other political theory or discourse: critiques
of prevailing power and institutions, outlets of politi‐
cal grievances, expressions of nationalism, support of
favored politicians, and demonization of rivals—all with
a deeper, ideological goal.
3. Digital Media and Popular Culture as Ideological
Intermediaries
3.1. Getting the Message Out
Ideological entrepreneurs need to sell their conspiracy
message through propaganda, here defined as “a sus‐
tained campaign of communication to enforce ideolog‐
ical goals, manage opinion and codify loyalties… aimed
towards consolidating identity, indoctrination and pro‐
ducing loyalty” (Hyzen, 2021). Our definition effectively
confirms earlier notions of propaganda described as
“the penetration of an ideology” (Ellul, 1965, p. 65)
where “the methods of propaganda” can be deployed
so that “specific allegiances and loyalties… will operate
to mollify the free will” of subjects (Bernays, 1928/2005,
p. 119). So, conspiracy‐ideological entrepreneurs create
and curate ideology in the form of conspiracy theory and
elaborate this position through propaganda campaigns
sustained by their own and/or third‐party (social) media
until the message/theory takes on a life of its own. Jones
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and Q, as ideological entrepreneurs, must remain rele‐
vant by producing new theories and by curating and cri‐
tiquing the ever‐evolving theories of others. Theirmodus
operandi is influenced by the affordances of contem‐
porary media and popular culture. Just like the early
20th century agitprop efforts to spread the communist
message throughout Soviet Russia using popular media
or ISIS posting on YouTube violent decapitation videos
overlaid with ideological messages in hopes of attract‐
ing mainstream media attention worldwide, so do con‐
temporary conspiracy‐ideological entrepreneurs employ
media at their disposal. Their aim: establish andmaintain
ideological goals and build an audience for their conspir‐
acies through the “manipulation of significant symbols”
(Lasswell, 1927, p. 627). Such symbols are not required
to be of a rational nature.
3.2. Playing the Media Game
As the mechanism by which conspiracy theorists elab‐
orate and spread their ideological positions and goals,
propaganda has no shortage of outlets in our media‐
rich environment. For one, like onlinemovements (Lyons,
2017), ideological entrepreneurs build their realm of
influence and rally support through alternative‐activist
media. Alternative media are defined as media that com‐
pensate for the shortcomings of mainstream media and
strengthen democracy through professional practices
and participatory communication (Atton, 2006, p. 574).
For some, conspiracist and right‐wing media are not
considered alternative because they develop community
with closure. However, we argue that alternative‐activist
media refer to media that are outside of the mainstream
or counter‐hegemonic, can have a left‐progressive (e.g.,
Chapo Trap House) or right/alt‐right (e.g., Breitbart) ori‐
entation, and can invite participatory communication
(e.g., 4chan, Reddit).
Alex Jones built his own alternative media to spread
his conspiracy message (Van den Bulck & Hyzen, 2020).
In the late 1990s, he built a reputation as a radio host.
Fired from broadcast radio for his radical views, in 1999,
he started the online Alex Jones show that was quickly
syndicated to a hundred stations through the Genesis
Communications Network. He combined a daily, three‐
hour radio show with a television show three days a
week, while developing Infowars.com. Embracing the
growth of social media, he developed a strong Twitter
presence and created 18 YouTube channels. In 2011, he
launched Infowars Nightly News TV program to anchor
his new subscriber TV network. By 2017, Jones was run‐
ning a multimedia business, had 2 million weekly radio
listeners, and reached up to 1,3 billion views for his
YouTube video channels, creating traffic to his websites
that accumulated to 20 million monthly visits. As such,
digital media greatly helped his visibility and reach with
a more mainstream audience.
At the same time, ideological entrepreneurs exploit
the web’s and social media’s opportunities for interac‐
tive participation. As Sharbaugh & Nguyen (2014, p. 137)
explain:
The significance of the Internet and social media for
political change is to be seen in the way these open,
networked tools empower people and organizations
to privately and publicly articulate and debate a wel‐
ter of conflicting views throughout society.
While this has been argued as the democratizing poten‐
tial of social media, they have also been embraced by
conspiracy ideological entrepreneurs. Like sections of
the alt‐right, conspiracism has “firm links with participa‐
tory, often fringe or even dark media networks through
websites such as 4chan, 8chan, and Reddit” (Heikkilä,
2017). Claiming to champion free speech, these plat‐
forms welcome communicators who may be banned
elsewhere. Alex Jones/Infowars was a popular topic on
these platforms, with followers/fans dissecting and dis‐
cussing his every word. QAnon’s start and rise are rooted
in these platforms, to the extent that, at the time of
writing, some suspect the 4chan/8chan/8kun founders
to be Q (Francescani, 2020). Participatory communica‐
tion is at QAnon’s core; Q’s drops are meant to engage
followers, inviting them to trace and collect evidence of
conspiracies, similar to immersive games.
Crucially, we argue, the role of interactive participa‐
tion in conspiracism extends beyond fringe platforms
to mainstream (social) media. Paolillo (2018) analyzes
YouTube as a space for Flat Earthers to come together,
sharing evidence, while Lewis (2018) discusses how
Facebook and Instagram influencers amplify fringe ide‐
ological messages. De Zeeuw et al. (2020) use the label
“normiefication” to explain how online diffusion across
culturally distinct web spheres helps counter‐cultural/
subcultural messages to move from the dark web to the
mainstream. Before being banned, Jones played into this
by repackaging his streamed radio and television shows
to fit web and socialmedia formats,markets and algorith‐
mic sorting and recommendation systems to reachwider
audiences. Jones used social media as mainstreaming
extensions and amplifiers of his alternative media and
message. Similarly, mainstream social media became
megaphones for QAnon’s ideological messages, as anons
post their fabricated proof of conspiracy on mainstream
social media where they garner broad attention and fol‐
lowing, well beyondUS borders. By the time social media
started banning profiles related to Alex Jones (from mid‐
2018) and QAnon (from late‐2020), these ideological
entrepreneurs had achieved their mainstreaming goal.
Finally, these conspiracy‐ideological entrepreneurs
embrace interaction provided by digital popular cul‐
ture, just like alt‐right groups. The latter deploy bash‐
ing and trolling tactics as well as online memes to
spread their extremist message, remixing and repurpos‐
ing popular cultural references like Pepe the frog and
using irony to hide their message in plain sight (Lyons,
2017). This makes it difficult to criticize and allows for
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inter‐ideological mingling (Graham, 2015), spreading the
message beyond primary target groups and fans tomain‐
stream audiences, ironic spectators, and even anti‐fans.
Indeed, while Byford (2014, p. 10) maintains that “[t]he
threat of ridicule… makes anticipating and reacting to
potential or actual charges of irrationality, paranoia or
prejudice, an essential feature of the conspiracy theo‐
rist’s endeavour,” such ridicule is not necessarily detri‐
mental to the ideological entrepreneur’s aim to catch
mainstream attention. This is similar to the PR ada‐
gio: There is no such thing as bad publicity. Byford
(2014, p. 14) concurs that “to cajole the mainstream
into a ‘debate’ with the conspiracy theorist… invariably
enhances the latter’s status and esteem.” Jones exploited
his on‐air antics’ meme‐able qualities and re‐edited his
media material to ignite a viral storm or hashtag war, in
favor of or against his claims. Discussing the fall‐out fol‐
lowing his role in spreading the Sandy Hook conspiracy
theory, he stated: “I’m under attack. And I summon the
meme war, I summon it all against the enemy” (Tilove,
2019). QAnon consistently encourages followers to col‐
lect and publish proof of the Deep State conspiracies by
all means possible.
3.3. Ideological Entrepreneurs and Celebrity
The entrepreneurs’ success hinges on their ability to
gain visibility and attention, often enabled by a level
of celebrity within and beyond the community of core
believers. Celebrity is based in mediated communication
(Driessens, 2014; Turner, 2004; Van den Bulck, 2018), so
it is not surprising that their primary media of commu‐
nication shapes the ideological entrepreneur’s visibility
and renown. Alex Jones’ celebrity has its basis in the
radio personality: a cross‐over between right‐wing talk
radio hosts like Glenn Beck (Jutel, 2018) and shock jocks
like Howard Stern and Don Imus (Hayes & Zechowski,
2014). His celebrity is vested, in part, in a distinct political
persona as a “deep‐digging” populist‐conspiracist that
results from the apparent merger of his public and pri‐
vate persona (Hyzen & Van den Bulck, 2021) and, in part,
in affective performativity, his melodramatic and exag‐
gerated style. Together, they create a sense of authentic‐
ity: Jones IS his message. This helps attract the attention
and following of conspiracy theory believerswho take his
message seriously andwider audiences that enjoyed and
even ridicule his antics. Jones’ embrace of new media
and online viral culture helped him to gain further visibil‐
ity and recognition beyond his primary target audience,
even among those opposing his message.
While Jones’ celebrity is based on the personal,
Q’s celebrity status results from the elusive as basic
celebrity appeal. Indeed, the celebrity appeal and power
of anonymity and of the (physical or symbolic)mask has a
long history (Merck, 2015). Turning a feature of its media
platform of choice into a tool, Q’s celebrity is based
on the anonymous nature of imageboards like 4chan
that obscure contributors’ identities while allowing for
a consistent, if anonymous, identity across posts. Even
though they are ideological opponents, Q’s celebrity is
closest to celebrity hackers collective Anonymous as well
as to recent whistle‐blowers whose celebrity preceded
their unmasking (Coleman, 2014). It is based on being
unknown but knowledgeable, necessitating anonymity
while holding the melodrama of potential unmasking.
As such, Q illustrates the political efficacy of anonymity
(Merck, 2015). In the context of Deep State conspira‐
cies, Q’s anonymity adds to the mystery. It makes Q
newsworthy and interesting, also for mainstream media
and audiences.
4. Duped, Empowered, or Immersed?
4.1. Psychological and Sociological Approaches
to Conspiracism
How to explain the attraction of conspiracy theo‐
ries to what appears to be an ever‐larger following?
Conspiracism has caught the attention of (social) psy‐
chology, an academic domain that considers it a pathol‐
ogy and focuses on the brain, especially the occur‐
rence of types (intentionality, confirmation, proportion‐
ality) of cognitive bias and on conspiracy believers’
personality. By means of a Conspiracy Mentality Scale,
people are identified as having a conspiracy mental‐
ity or as being conspiracy‐minded. Critics (Billig, 1989;
Byford, 2014; Cassam, 2020) question the methodolo‐
gies (surveys/experiments as tools, make up of samples,
etc.) and normative position of researchers in this field
that assume “people are at fault for believing [conspir‐
acy theories]” (Cassam, 2020, pp. 38–39) or that conspir‐
acies are “neutral” (Byford, 2014, p. 12; see also, Billig,
1989). The approach ignores the role of ideology in peo‐
ple’s adherence to conspiracy theories, while, for Cassam
(2020, p. 45), a conspiracy mindset is not a personality
trait but an ideology: “Fundamental to conspiracism is
the belief that people in authority are hiding things from
the rest of us as part of a conspiracy to achieve their own
sinister goals.” From this perspective, still according to
Cassam (2020, p. 48): “The ideology of conspiracism is
attractive to some because it fits their broader ideologi‐
cal or political commitments,” which can be right or left
leaning but tend to be extremist.
Taking a “sociological perspective,” Byford (2014,
pp. 10–11) urges us to consider conspiracism in the
context of “how historically situated ideologies, world‐
views and cultural traditions produce and sustain par‐
ticular patterns of thinking and behaviour.” In this light,
Cassam (2020, p. 53) points to how earlier social devel‐
opments can affect current beliefs. For instance, for
members of communities that have been the victim
of proven conspiracies, that context makes them more
susceptible to unproven conspiracy theories. An exam‐
ple is the relationship between the popularity of anti‐
vax conspiracies in US black communities and the dis‐
turbing history of drug trial abuse, most notably the
Media and Communication, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 3, Pages 179–188 184
Tuskegee study (Billauer, 2020). In this context, you do
not have to be an extremist to engage with the conspir‐
acy. Others (e.g., Freeman & Bentall, 2017) focus on how
people’s belief in conspiracy theories relates to feelings
ofmarginalization and lack of agency/control. Hofstadter
(2012) connects this to Durkheim’s (1897/1951) notion
of anomie: In a world where (you are told that) famil‐
iar norms are eroding, individuals experience powerless‐
ness. Conspiracy theories fill the hole left by the demise
of traditional political doctrine and ethnoscience, help
people make sense of the world and restore a sense of
control and predictability through simple, externalized
explanations and the identification of an opponent.
Accounts about Jones’ and QAnon’s followers sug‐
gest a considerable part fits the conception of con‐
spiracists as disenfranchised, feeling marginalized
and lacking control, with the conspiracy‐ideological
entrepreneurs offering an alternative. Two groups can
be identified. First, there is a dedicated if eclectic fol‐
lowing of individual and loosely networked alt‐right
folks, libertarians, the manoscape, and doomsday prep‐
pers. Confirming the relationship between conspir‐
acy and anomie, Socolow (2018, para. 30) says about
Jones/Infowars: “They speak to—and claim to speak
for—not simply the downtrodden and downwardly‐
mobile; they also speak to those feeling wronged
and forgotten.” QAnon appeals to similar alt‐right and
manoscape groups such as Proud Boys, while Trump’s
explicit identification as part of the solution ensured suc‐
cess with Make America Great Again followers.
A second related audience is not alt‐right but
likewise feels abandoned by government and society.
Interviewing Jones fans, Belluz (2017, para. 7) found:
The Infowarriors I spoke to didn’t fit the stereotypes.
Most said they believed in climate change and the
benefits of vaccines. Somewere former NPR listeners
who felt the mainstream media had let them down.
Others were looking for interesting and alternative
opinions online. Still others championed science.
What brings them to Alex Jones is that they “felt let down
by government, medicine and the media” (Belluz, 2017,
para. 33). Reflecting on the diverse group of intruders on
the US Capitol, Heath and Lynch (2021, para. 2) found
that, next to alt‐right: “Court documents paint a picture
of a diverse mob that included both citizens with main‐
stream careers—police officers, a flower shop owner,
a state lawmaker, military veterans, even an Olympic
medalist—as well as Americans on the fringe.”
Calling it a “Pottery Barn Insurrection,” Bunch (2021,
para. 3) suggests that, rather than the economic down‐
trodden, the January 6 rioters:
Came from lush‐green suburbs all across this land, fly‐
ing business class on Delta or United and staying in
four‐star hotels with three‐martini lobby bars—the
better to keep warm after a long day of taking selfies
with friendly cops or pummeling the unfriendly ones,
chanting “Hang Mike Pence!”
Other authors (e.g., Zuckerman & McQuade, 2019) sug‐
gest that a considerable part of the audience does not fit
either group of conspiracists.
4.2. The Conspiracist‐Fan
Expanding the theoretical lens to digital audience stud‐
ies and fan studies reflects the highly mediated nature
of how followers come into contact, engage, and interact
with conspiracy theories and their entrepreneurs, build‐
ing on an historical interplay of audienceship and politi‐
cal participation (Sandvoss, 2013). Furthermore, it draws
attention to a more diverse set of motivations to follow
conspiracy‐ideological entrepreneurs and to the dynamic
nature of the involvement. With regards to the latter,
social media, blogs, podcasts, and the chat boards, fre‐
quented by conspiracy theories believers, such as the
QAnon’ and Jones’ followers, are lively places of discus‐
sion and debate, creating communities and, we could
argue, fans.
Sandvoss (2005, p. 8) defines fandom as the “regular,
emotionally involved consumption of a given narrative or
text.” On the one hand, thinking about conspiracists as
fans can help appreciate the active and affective involve‐
ment of conspiracy theory believers. Work by Jenkins
(2006) and Sandvoss (2013), amongst others, has shown
parallels between participation in political discourse and
political activism and fandom in popular culture. In both
cases, such engagement becomes an important identity
resource. The ideological nature of conspiracy theories
informs a parallel with Sandvoss’ (2013, p. 252) concep‐
tualization of political enthusiasm “as a form of media
fandom, in which [media activity] constitute forms of
enunciative and textual productivity.” As such, the rela‐
tionship between conspiracy theories and followers is
similar to an affective bond between fan objects and fans.
Jones’ followers demonstrate fan‐like behavior in their
detailed dissecting of Jones’ every word in endless—now
removed—threads. QAnon’s basic principle is active par‐
ticipation and decentralized storytelling, with followers
creating social media content explaining their interpre‐
tations, which Zuckerman and McQuade (2019) dubs a
form of fan fiction.
On the other hand, a fan perspective can provide
insight into conspiracy followers that do not fit the pro‐
file of the politically disenfranchised nor of the deeply
involved conspiracy believer. Chang’s (2018, para. 10)
analysis of QAnon enthusiasts on Reddit found that
“most participants are relatively casual conspiracy theo‐
rists….Their interests coalesce around things like video
games, cryptocurrency, men’s rights, and martial arts.”
They come for the fun of the immersive game and the
community, more than the conspiracy or the sense of
regaining control. In the case of Jones, many fans are
attracted not so much to his message as to his persona
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as exuberant performer. Looking at Jones’ followers as
audiences and fans also allows for an understanding of
various ways in which his message is decoded, with their
involvement being ironic and even oppositional while
still embracing the experience and community. Indeed,
part of his fame comes from parodies, meme culture,
and remixes such as those from video creator Vic Berger
who adds music and special effects to Jones’ broadcasts
and posts the edits on social media to popular response.
These ironic spectators do not necessarily believe nor
oppose Jones’ ideas but enjoy his rants as entertainment
and enjoy making fun of his man’s man performances.
This group includes members of the general public and
public figures like stand‐up comedian, commentator, and
podcast host Joe Rogan. This type of audience is both
instrumental in and part of themainstreaming of conspir‐
acy theories.
5. Discussion: All Fired Up but Nowhere to Go?
This contribution has presented a cross‐disciplinary
framework allowing for a contextualized understanding
of contemporary conspiracism as ideological work occur‐
ring at the crossroads of politics and digital popular cul‐
ture. It has pointed to the crucial role of ideological
entrepreneurs that work with the affordances of digital
media and popular culture to propagate their message
and push it from the margins to the mainstream.
Certain conspiracies may not fit our conceptualiza‐
tion. For instance, conspiracy theories regarding the
death of Elvis (still alive) or Princess Diana (not an acci‐
dent) can be explained starting from a perspective of
fandom, i.e., fans dealing with the loss of their idol‐
ized object of fandom to a random, “banal” event such
as a heart attack or a car accident, rather than from
a deeper ideological base. While not dismissing these
cases, we argue that these examples do not undermine
the notion that a majority of conspiracy theories pri‐
marily serve ideological goals. Similarly, the ideological
entrepreneur’s role may not always be as clearly identi‐
fiable or dominant as in the case of Jones and QAnon.
We aimed to show how these entrepreneurs are instru‐
mental in pushing conspiracies from the fringe to the
mainstream. This is not a one‐size‐fits‐all explanation
but a general conceptualization that allows for differ‐
ent particulars of specific conspiracy theories. In a dig‐
itized environment, people move easily between indi‐
viduals, groups, and institutions, merging the political
and the popular, civic values and commodity. This is
the context in which contemporary conspiracism flour‐
ishes. Through mediated communication and aided by
the force of celebrity and popular culture, ideological
entrepreneurs like Alex Jones and QAnon push their con‐
spiracies, gathering a diverse mix of followers. These
include people deeply involved in the ideological mes‐
sage and its promise of an empowering alternative world
view, casual fans enjoying the antics (Jones) and immer‐
sive experience (QAnon) and community as much as
the ideological message, as well as ironic spectators.
Together, they push the conspiracy message from the
fringe to the mainstream. Much more work is needed
to understand these dynamics better. This will require
the full conceptual andmethodological toolbox available
to scholars of popular culture as much as of politics and
political communication.
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